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Introduction
I am delighted to be back in Japan, especially in Keidanren where I have spoken many
times before. In the Preface which I wrote for the Japanese edition of one of my many books in
Japanese translation, I said that there were three countries I felt special affinity to: India where I
was born and raised, the United States where I have migrated and work, and Japan (which I
visited in 1961 for over a month for the Indian Committee of Wise Men on Indo-Japanese
cooperation and where my Japanese counterpart for the Japanese Committee was Koito Saburo
and) whose literature, films and culture I greatly admire.
This is a good time to visit Japan because of the economy’s performance in the last
quarter which, after a protracted stagnation and even decline, has been rather good. If your
Shinto gods are kind to you, you will have another such quarter and will finally snap out of the
last two years of recession. But today, I will want to talk of “long-run” issues.
In particular, the theme of my talk today is economic freedom and development. And that
topic too is timely because I believe that Japan is ready to enter into an era of deregulation. A
movement toward deregulation has been expected, or rather hoped for, for a long time now; and
it seems that the recession and Japan’s brush with a “missing decade” of development, have now
begun to provide just the sense of crisis that is often necessary to get a country moving towards
economic reforms.
Indeed, around the world, you can see examples where statesmen have been forced by
crises into reforms, whether autonomously chosen or imposed aiding institutions such as the IMF
and the World Bank that impose the necessary conditionality in the form of the ultimatum:
“reform or we do not assist you”.  The latter is, of course, what developing and transition
countries that wind up being basket cases face by way of the path to necessary reforms. The
former is what Japan, a leading developed country, must follow: using the longstanding crisis of
stagnation to take autonomously the necessary reform path.
Interestingly, the Soviet case is a combination of both, starting out with Gorbachev’s
perestroika basket of autonomous reforms and then transiting to Western and INF
conditionalities driving the course of reforms (with yet no end in sight). The reforms under
Gorbachev were clearly driven by the recognition among Russian leaders that the economic
model of central planning could not be continued without the Soviet Union being ground down
into economic paralysis. This perception was, of course, bolstered by econometric and other
scholarly studies of the Soviet experience which showed that the Soviet economic growth was
steadily decelerating, with the huge investment rates producing steadily lower growth rates. The
econometric estimates suggest two hypotheses, which both can tell the “story” with good fits:
first, that capital accumulation was running into diminishing returns and second, that the overall
productivity of all resources was winding down because of  economic and political conditions
and lack of incentives for production, investment and innovation. 1 No one familiar with the
Soviet economy would choose the first explanation as Paul Krugman did in drawing, in my view,
an erroneous parallel between East Asia (where the alarm at prospective diminishing returns
made little sense anyway) and the Soviet Union in his wellknown Foreign Affairs article on the
“myth” of the Asian miracle. Surely, the second explanation fit the Soviet Union better. And the
reforms were prompted by the realization that the Soviet model, with its huge and growing
adverse impact on the economy’s performance, had to be abandoned. But the reforms did not
                                                
1 Professor Padma Desai, the Soviet and Russian economics expert at Columbia University, has written extensively
on the choice between these two explanations, in several professional journals such as the American Economic
Review and in a long essay that provides the Introduction to her collected essays, The Soviet Economy:
Performance and Prospects , Basil Blackwell Ltd.: U.K.,  1995.
succeed, for a  variety of reasons, and the Russian economic performance, now driven by
conditionality (of varying effectiveness), has actually plunged even further!
To return to Japan, which must follow the autonomous change model (though there is no
dearth of advice and admonition from outside), I will now proceed to consider the problem of
economic freedom and economic prosperity or development in a broader framework than mere
deregulation  implies. Indeed, the question of economic freedom has now become nearly as
important as the question of political freedom: and the relevance of either or both to economic
prosperity and social progress is attracting much attention.
From the viewpoint of recent historical experience, particularly in the postwar period, it
is not difficult to assert that economic freedom is likely to have a favorable effect on economic
prosperity,  for the simple reason that the last fifty years of international experience more or less
confirms the fact that wherever governments used markets more and engaged in more open
policies in foreign trade and investment, indeed in more economic freedom of different kinds,
their countries have tended to prosper. By contrast, those countries that turned inward and had
extensive regulations of all kinds on domestic economic decision-making in production,
investment and innovation, are the countries that have really not done too well.
So now we also find that many developing countries, which used to follow the alternative
non-liberal path and have not done well,  have also begun to renounce their old ways and have
turned to what can properly called “liberal” economic reforms, essentially freeing up the
economy and the energies of their people, and embarking on rapid development.
So, I must say that arguing for more economic freedom is in this sense an easy task. At
the same time, it is not really easy; or, better still, we should not treat it as if it was that easy.  In
fact one has to make the case for liberalization, whether domestic or in the international spheres,
in a nuanced and sophisticated way.
To see this most clearly, consider the fact that, alongside the demonstrated success of
trade liberalization in the postwar period in raising incomes and even growth rates (a conclusion
that few economists doubt today2), we have also the apparent failure of capital flows
liberalization as epitomized by the 1994 Mexican peso crisis that engulfed both Mexico and my
good friend and fine economist, the Finance Minister Jaime Serra, and by the far more
devastating Asian financial crisis that came later. Indeed, with these financial crises, the public
sentiment around the world, and certainly in Asia, has turned against globalization and its
associated economic freedoms, i.e. against what we used to call the Liberal International
Economic Order (LIEO) in contrast to the demands for the New International Economic Order
(NIEO)in the 1970s in the aftermath of  the OPEC cartel’s  success and the first flush, and indeed
the last hurrah, of the false sense that the era of Commodity Power of the poor countries had
finally arrived.3 The recent mindless outbursts by all kinds of ill-informed groups against
globalization and against capitalism and markets in the streets of Seattle at the November-
December 1999 meetings of the WTO and then again at the April 2000 meetings of the IMF and
the World Bank are in their own ways a replay of the apparently invincible demands against the
very same sorts of liberal-economic  approaches that fizzled out by late 1970s when exposed to
the harsh realities of economic logic and sound commonsense.
                                                
2 The only recent example of an economist with some reputation who writes against the efficacy of trade as an
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3 Cf. Bhagwati (ed.), The New International Economic Order, MIT Press: Cambridge; and Bhagwati and John
Ruggie (eds.), Power, Passions and Purpose, MIT Press: Cambridge.
Economic Freedom: Two Aspects
I shall divide my remarks into two parts:
(1) Assuming away the international dimension of economic freedom, I will first discuss
the key economic freedoms that are relevant, both under autarky and openness, to
economic prosperity; and
(2) I will then address the international dimensions of economic freedom, distinguishing
among free trade, freedom of capital flows (both short-term and direct foreign
investment (DFI)) and migration across national borders.
1. Key Aspects of Economic Freedom in any Economy
Three aspects of economic freedom need to be emphasized:
· property rights;
· markets versus pervasive governmental  intervention; and
· ability to procure livelihood outside the public/governmental sector, i.e. absence of
preponderance of governmental employment over private employment or self-
employment earning opportunity and ability to use it.
Let me make a number of observations on all these elements and on how and why they
 contribute to economic success.
(1) Property rights and markets provide a direct effect on economic prosperity: they
 provide the incentives to produce and allocate resources efficiently: a case that goes back to
Adam Smith and the founding of economic science. Intellectual property rights (IPR) should also
fall into this category from the viewpoint of the incentive to innovate; but they do not quite do
so, from a Benthamite perspective of maximum good to society. Why? Because we have a trade-
off between gains from more innovation under IPR and gains from diffusion of given innovation
without IPR. But, to my knowledge, few believe that the optimum IPR is zero; and so do few
believe that it extends as high as the 20-year patent rule that was forced into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) by the business lobbies!
The historical evidence in favour of the economic benefits of markets and property
 rights is to be found in David Landes’s magisterial work, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations:
Why Some are So Rich and Some So Poor.4 Landes shows convincingly how Europe’s success,
and China’s failure, in the perspective of the last millennium’s winners and losers can be put
down precisely to the fact that Europe, unlike China, embraced property rights and markets.
Landes’s arguments are supported also by the recent regressions-based  arguments of Surjit
Bhalla (who is on the Panel today) and of Robert Barro which relate to postwar experience
instead.
(2) Again, economic freedom in the shape of property rights and the ability to earn
income outside of government surely strengthens democracy (i.e. political and civil freedom) in
turn because inability to find sustenance can cripple, at least seriously handicap, political
independence and dissent.
So then, economic freedom also helps economic prosperity, not just directly, but also
indirectly since economic freedoms, coupled with political and civil freedoms (which they aid as
argued above), are in combination the most powerful engine for prosperity. 5
(3) I should emphasize that economic freedoms can strengthen the quality of democracy
                                                
4 Cf. Landes, Norton, 1998. Also see the review of it by me, “The Explanation” in The New Republic, May 25,
1998, being reprinted in my selection of essays, The Policy Paradox: Foreign Failures amidst Domestic Successes,
MIT Press: 2000.
as well, and hence the quality of development. This is because their growth-enhancing ability can
help pull excluded groups (e.g. women, the poor) into literacy, gainful employment, better health
et.al. through, first,  enhanced ability to finance public expenditures and second, through their
direct effect on improving their incentive to achieve greater literacy and health as well.
The former effect follows from the fact that revenues will generally improve with greater
growth, at any given tax rates. The latter effect is less obvious but as plausible. Thus, if
opportunities grow as the economy prospers, so will the incentive of poor parents in particular to
send children to primary school rather than to work: An effect which seems to have been
demonstrated in India where the huge illiteracy rates during a quarter century of low growth rates
seem finally to have been dented after growth rates picked up significantly in the 1980s.  Again,
since the efficacy of public health expenditures depends (in several cases)to some extent on the
beneficiary’s own financial ability to complement what is received gratis from health authorities,
this complementarity also means that greater prosperity directly improves health.
Indeed the point is quite general. The efficacy of social legislation in general depends on
economic prosperity. Consider social legislation saying that if you beat up your wife, you will go
to jail. But if the wife cannot walk out on you and get a job in a stagnating economy, how is she
going to be able to assert her legislated rights?  In short, when economic freedom produces
economic prosperity, it also tends to aid in the pursuit of  social progress: sometimes, all good
things do go together!
(4) Finally, let me say emphatically that the absence of economic freedom is an ally of
 corruption. True, corruption has many fathers. But the most fertile and fecund father is what
Indians call a “permit raj”, i.e. an economic regime where governments demand that permits be
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of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and democracy, MIT Press: 1998.
procured to produce, to import, to invest, to innovate, to do almost anything! It needs no
particular gifts to see that such an economic regime leads to cataclysmic levels of corruption; as
it did in South Asia. It also corrupts even democratic and quasi-democratic regimes into “crony
capitalism” as in some segments of the economy in Indonesia.
2. International Aspects of Economic Freedom
So, I turn now to the international aspects of economic freedom, or perhaps of  the LIEO,
and examine whether they add to economic prosperity. These are:
· free trade;
· free capital flows
· free DFI (direct foreign investment)
· free immigration.
At the outset, let me note that, while there are important similarities among them, there are also
important asymmetries, both economic and political, among them. These asymmetries mean that,
if we are to push for economic freedom on all these different dimensions, we need appropriate
policies to do so and one suit will simply not fit all . Indeed, the failure to understand this central
fact has led to avoidable downsides in policy steps taken to liberalize further the world economic
system in the last decade.
Free Trade
 I would say that, except for a few diehards, few today oppose free trade. In that sense,
we free traders have won the war against the protectionists. Indeed, the case for free trade is now
generally seen to be even stronger than that we have usually taught, from Adam Smith, now that
we consider how it can lead to greater variety in consumption, greater use of scale economies in
production, and even more efficiency because it can enhance competition and prevent
entrepreneurs from going to seed in sheltered markets. In addition, I have noted recently that
trade, or outward orientation, can also explain why the Far Eastern economies managed to
sustain high (and productive) investment rates whereas the protectionist, inward-looking
countries like India had lower (and less productive)investment rates:  the latter countries’
investment rates were circumscribed by the growth of the domestic market which was inevitably
limited in turn by inevitably low agricultural growth rates whereas the former set of countries
Indeed, the case for free trade is now generally seen to be even stronger than that we have
usually taught, from Adam Smith, now that we consider how it can lead to greater variety in
consumption, greater use of scale economies in production, and even more efficiency because it
can enhance competition and prevent entrepreneurs from going to seed in sheltered markets. In
addition, I have noted recently that trade, or outward orientation, can also explain why the Far
Eastern economies managed to sustain high (and productive) investment rates whereas the
protectionist, inward-looking countries like India had lower (and less productive)investment
rates:  the latter countries’ investment rates were circumscribed by the growth of the domestic
market which was inevitably limited in turn by inevitably low agricultural growth rates whereas
the former set of countries had the world economy, and a rapidly expanding one too in the
1960s) as their market.
These lessons have been widely learnt. In particular, the developing countries that, in the
1950s and 1960s, were fearful of free trade have now turned around and see trade as an
opportunity, not as a peril. President Salinas and his team looked across Rio Grande and, instead
of sighing like his predecessor, Porfirio Diaz who said famously: “Poor Mexico, how far from
God and how near the United States”, assiduously embraced  the United States as a gift arising
from proximity. Similarly, President Cardoso of Brazil has renounced the celebrated
dependencia thesis that he formulated as South America’s best-known sociologist and now
pushes for integration into the world economy instead. And that is the story around the
developing world.
The problems about free trade as an engine of prosperity now surface in the rich countries
instead, in what I have called an “ironic reversal”. And they come principally from the labour
unions and from NGOs (non-governmental organizations), the former fearful of competition
from the poor countries, the latter pushing a number of  trade-unrelated agendas (such as better
environmental regulation) by often pretending that trade and other forms of  globalization are the
cause of damage in their areas of concern.
The unions’ concerns about the adverse effect of trade on real wages of workers are, in
my view, misplaced. Most international economists who have looked at the problem have come
to the conclusion that the real wage decline in the 1980s in the United  States, for example, could
not be attributed to trade except for negligible fraction such as 10-15%. My own work argues
that actually trade has even helped; that it has moderated the decline in real wages that was
coming from technical change that was reducing demand for unskilled labour.
The notion that outsourcing of production was a threat that would reduce the bargaining
power of the unions, and hence hurt their wages, also makes little sense for the US since unions
cover less than 14% of the labour force anyway.  Besides, the outflow of direct investment (DFI)
was almost offset by the inflow of DFI during the 1980s. This is a fact often forgotten when
fearful unions and politicians look only at the outflow. Thus, when  I was in a BBC radio debate
on globalization, with Martin Wolf of The Financial Times on my side against two vociferous
but incoherent anti-globalization “activists” on the other side, they ran a tape where the mayor of
the French town from which Hoover was leaving for the UK was declaiming against
multinationals abandoning  locations and communities in pursuit of greed. So, I said pointedly
that the mayor had not complained when Hoover, a US firm, had come to his town in France in
the first place!
The politicians in the developed countries need to contend with these reactionary forces,
meeting their claims against free trade head on. One only hopes they will, though one may only
despair when one sees their frequent surrender to these untenable objections, at least in
Washington.
Free Capital Flows
But if the case for free trade is sound and only requires forceful and repeated statement of
it without apologies by our politicians in the public arena, the question of freedom of capital
flows is a far trickier issue. Let me explain since you may well ask why I am not equally
enthusiastic about it.
True, there are important similarities between trade and capital flows. Each time you
segment a market, you incur an efficiency loss (which economists call a deadweight loss). You
also lose the freedom of investors to place their money where they wish: which is an
abridgement of their rights. The same is true, of course, of interference with free trade.
But then we have a basic dissimilarity on the economic front. If I exchange my toothpaste
for your toothbrush, we both gain And no crisis can be imagined as a possibility. Think now of
free capital flows instead. With crisis after crisis materializing, in countries as diverse as South
Korea, Thailand, Mexico and Russia, I am cautious and cannot take for granted the repeated
assurances that Messrs. Robert Rubin, Stanley Fischer and Larry Summers have figured out
ways of preventing such crises from materializing in the world economy as capital flows begin to
occur on a substantial scale and countries are encouraged, virtually forced by pressures from the
IMF and the US Treasury to dismantle barriers to capital flows.
So, if these crises will occur, until we have really figured out how to avoid them, then
what I have argued in many places is that the gains from freeing up capital flows must be set
against the losses from the crises adjusted for the probability that they will occur. Besides, I have
also argued (in my May 1998 Foreign Affairs article that was provocatively titled by the editors
as The Capital Myth) that the proponents of  free capital flows have simply asserted that the
deadweight gains would be “mammoth” but that they had produced no evidence that they were
whereas, for trade, there were several studies of the cost of protection and we did have broad
orders of magnitude (which incidentally were by no means “mammoth”).
Hence, I propose prudence in moving to capital account convertibility: a suggestion that
the IMF now has quietly adopted as far as one can tell. Sure enough, the proponents of free
capital flows are correct in saying that greater transparency and better banking practices would
help. But how come they are so sure that these are sufficient, not just necessary, to avoid the
financial crises that we have repeatedly witnessed?
I am afraid that an attitude of complacency on this issue is not just unwise; it can be fatal
to other, more tractable forms of globalization and economic freedom such as the case for free
trade. In fact, whenever I discuss free trade with its opponents, they  invariably begin today with
the Asian financial crisis, as if that showed that free trade was also bad! That is of course a non
sequitur; but only you and I understand that.
Was Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir right in using capital controls in Malaysia? That is a
different issue from whether, say, India should embrace capital account convertibility.
Malaysia’s question was instead: should it abandon capital account convertibility? We all know
that Malaysia did not do badly by using capital account controls, at least by comparison with
other afflicted countries. My view, however, is that this was not due to such controls per se;
rather it was because, by not going to the IMF and by going alone in response to the crisis,
Malaysia avoided the unduly deflationary IMF conditionality that was wholly inappropriate to its
solution.
In any event, it seems clear to most of us that, when we free up capital flows, we need at
least two policy instruments to accompany that: first, the monitoring of the flows to send off
alarm signals if they are proving to be unduly large relative to fundamentals;  and second, the
willingness to use Chilean-type taxes on capital inflows when these alarm signals do go off. If
we do this, then we can certainly make the freeing up of capital flows less likely to create havoc
through massive reversals of inflows under panic conditions.
Freeing DFI
The freeing of direct foreign investment is a much easier problem, just like freer trade,
because equity capital coming in as real direct investment doesn’t withdraw itself rapidly due to
panic. It is sticky. It tends to stay for the long run. Besides, the bundling together of the know-
how, the management techniques, and the financial capital which a multinational investment
usually involves is extremely useful.
Today, we also understand better the central truth that no country is so smart that it
cannot learn from the investment and the know-how that comes in with foreign firms. Remember
that, even if you have intense competition amongst yourselves and you learn from each other,
you are still all part of the same culture. So there is a limit to how much you can learn from each
other. You can learn far more by dealing with or competing against firms and people from
another cultural background. The creativity which follows as a result of that interaction is
enormously important. Thus, I firmly believe that Japan has been depriving itself, and so has
Korea for that matter, by choosing to resist foreign investment inflows and relying only on
importing unbundled technology. So I see the acceptance of foreign investment as a welcome
development in Japan even though it has come under the crisis conditions of the last three years.
Indeed, pursuant to what I have argued above, the  thinking on direct foreign investment
has also changed now among developing-country policymakers and in professional economic
circles from the more pessimistic and fearful  to one where DFI inflow is welcomed and attempts
are being made to increase it. Doors are opening to DFI worldwide, with its advantages now seen
more clearly than ever before.
But I should add that there is, as with free trade, a backlash now in the developed world
instead. This comes largely from NGOs (non-governmental organizations) that see corporations
primarily as evil. These viewpoints come principally from the Ralph Nader tradition. This great
consumer activist began his distinguished career  by taking on the defects in the car Corvair,
writing his famous book, Unsafe at Any Speed. But his mindset that, therefore, corporations are
out to cheat you is too simplistic and unfair. But these kinds of viewpoints find ready customers
among the young and nubile students on campuses in the United States: puncturing their noses
and ears and lips, they can be seen frequently in small groups of chanting demonstrators with
placards denouncing corporations.
What that has done is to set off alarm bells against attempts to create codes on DFI such
as the OECD’s now-suspended effort at creating a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. It
became a casualty to fierce opposition from the NGOs. It was also a flawed instrument since it
was focused too much on the so-called “rights” of foreign investors (including of short-term
capital  flows) vis-à-vis host countries and virtually omitting sophisticated and nuanced nods in
the direction of host-country rights and the obligations of the foreign investors (as distinct from
their rights). This highly-unbalanced code, in turn, made attempts at putting investment rules into
the World Trade Organization (WTO) look altogether dangerous to non-corporate interests.
Thus, a foolish OECD enterprise, reflecting the overreach of the multinationals, has cost us
progress at the WTO on defining a useful set of disciplines in the area of DFI.
Immigration
Finally let me talk about immigration and say to my Japanese friends that the strength of
America is basically the fact that it is continuously renewing itself. Its main strength comes from
the fact that it takes in the best talent from around the world. But, no matter whom it takes in, it
provides them and their children in particular with the finest economic opportunities that enable
nearly everyone to reach their potential.
In fact, in my class at Columbia University, the largest number of students from a single
country is from Japan. Indeed, there are so many foreign students in each class that often it
seems as if the native-born Americans in the class are a minority! The remarkable thing is that
these Americans welcome the foreigners with open arms: their attitudes, particularly in the
universities, reflect the fact that America has been built by immigrants. There lies its uniqueness.
And that uniqueness confers on the US the enormous competitive advantage which I just
noted. Last year  Nikkei  asked me to write an article to be published at the turn of the year
regarding the next century. I wrote saying that the nineteenth century was British  while the
twentieth century was American. Would the next century be Pacific as often thought in the
1980s? Instead, I wrote that the twenty-first century was also likely to be American.
Why? Not because, as many believe, the US has splendid venture capital markets that can
finance the new economy’s entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley and elsewhere: after all, anyone can
imitate that without difficulty. Certainly Japan can!
But which traditional country, particularly one such as Japan with its racial homogeneity
and fear of immigration, can really open its doors as wide as the US and profit from the influx of
the immigrants?  It will be a long time indeed, if at all, before  Japan will be able to overcome its
inherited anti-immigration attitudes and  catch up with the US on this important dimension. And,
as long as it stays behind, the US will remain at a great advantage in its dynamism and its ability
to remain Number One.
The real lesson I would like to bring to you today is that the 21st century is not going to
be a Japanese century unless you can really learn this secret of US strength and come to terms
with your mistake in insulating yourselves from the benefits of freer  immigration. I know that
Japan finds it difficult to contemplate immigration, especially from diverse ethnicities. But you
do have examples of change by other societies which were not that much better at this game. For
instance,  Australia was once very exclusive but it has opened up to immigration from around the
world, coming somewhat closer to what the United States does. And that is where you will need
to go.
Of course, you cannot have completely free immigration because nation states are
defined by exclusion. All I am saying is that you should have much a freer and more relaxed
attitude towards this issue. At least at the level of skilled immigration, you can free up much
more and try attaining that synergy, that interactive creative serendipity, which comes with it.
Concluding Remark
So I would conclude  that economic freedom along all of these dimensions is the
direction in which Japan has to move. Deregulation is only part of Japan’s unfinished agenda: it
will free up the domestic economy. But an intensive and frank  look at all of the international
dimensions of economic freedom as well is necessary as Japan enters the 21st  century. There
alone lies the hope that Japan will retain the prominence that it achieved through its remarkable,
quality-manufactures-based recovery in the postwar period.
